Difficulties in benchmarking ecological null models: an assessment of current methods by Molina, C. & Stone, L.
(MR. CHAI  MOLINA (Orcid ID : 0000-0001-9722-4446
Article type      : Articles
Difficulties in benchmarking ecological null models: an assessment of current 
methods 
Chai Molina1,2,5 and Lewi Stone3,4
1Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton NJ, USA
2International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
3Biomathematics Unit, Department of Zoology, Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel Aviv University
4 Mathematics, School Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
5 Corresponding Author. E-mail: chai.molina@gmail.com
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not 
been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may 
lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as 
doi: 10.1002/ecy.2945 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
Running Head: Benchmarking ecological null models
Abstract 
Identifying species interactions and detecting when ecological communities are structured by them 
is an important problem in ecology and biogeography. Ecologists have developed specialized 
statistical hypothesis tests to detect patterns indicative of community-wide processes in their field 
data. In this respect, null model approaches have proved particularly popular. The freedom 
allowed in choosing the null model and statistic to construct a hypothesis test leads to a 
proliferation of possible hypothesis tests from which ecologists can choose to detect these 
processes. Here, we point out some serious shortcomings of a popular approach to choosing the 
best hypothesis for the ecological problem at hand that involves benchmarking different 
hypothesis tests by assessing their performance on artificially constructed datasets.  
Terminological errors concerning the use of Type-I and Type-II errors that underlie these 
approaches are discussed.  We argue that the key benchmarking methods proposed in the literature 
are not a sound guide for selecting null hypothesis tests, and further, that there is no simple way to 
benchmark null hypothesis tests. Surprisingly, the basic problems identified here do not appear to 
have been addressed previously, and these methods are still being used to develop and test new 
null models and summary statistics, from quantifying community structure (e.g., nestedness and 
modularity) to analyzing ecological networks.
 
Keywords:  Null models, Type I error, Type II error, Benchmarking, Power, Robustness, 
Community structure
Introduction
A long-standing debate in biogeography concerns the composition of ecological 
communities and the identification of species interactions that might structure them (Cody and 
Diamond 1975, Gotelli 1999, Weiher and Keddy 1999). As a result, ecologists have developed 
specialized statistical tools that test for the presence of patterns indicative of community-wide 
processes, such as interspecific competition, in their field data. Null model approaches have A
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proved particularly popular (Gotelli and Graves 1996) and over the last twenty years have been 
applied in thousands of published studies. Given the plethora of possible null models, Gotelli 
(2000) and Ulrich and Gotelli (2010) have devised a benchmarking procedure for choosing the 
most appropriate one for a given ecological application. Here, we argue that the benchmarking 
methods they propose are problematic and do not yield an appropriate yardstick for selecting a 
null hypothesis test.
We focus on ecological community data in the form of an abundance matrix. The entries of 
such a matrix, , represent the abundance of species-  at sample site-  as quantified by either 𝑎𝑖𝑗  𝑖 𝑗
counts of observations of individuals, or their densities. Each row in the matrix represents the 
abundances of a species at different sites. Columns represent the different focal communities or 
different sites. The entire abundance matrix represents the metacommunity of species at the 
sampled sites. Summing up the elements along row-  gives the abundance of species  across all  𝑖 𝑖
sites, and variability in the row sums may indicate that some species colonize sites better than 
others. Similarly, summing the entries of the th column gives the total species abundance at site  , 𝑗 𝑗
and variability in the column sums may indicate that some sites or focal communities are 
colonized more easily, or that they can support greater species richness.  The distributions of the 
row and column sums are important defining features of a metacommunity (Connor and 
Simberloff 1979).
A number of null model algorithms have been developed to generate random simulated abundance 
matrices that are by design unstructured, in that the process by which abundances of each species 
at each site are allocated do not involve any species interaction or other community structure. 
Often a great deal of thought has been given to defining what is meant by random in this context, 
and devising tests to ensure that these metacommunities are truly random (Artzy-Randrup and 
Stone 2005; Stone and Roberts 1990,1992). Some null model algorithms generate matrices subject 
to realistic constraints (specific to the null hypothesis under consideration), and are thus able to 
simulate key features or constraints that may occur in real data, without incorporating any 
ecological mechanisms related to species interaction that we suspect might result in community 
structure. Using a null model, it is then possible to statistically test whether a given dataset is 
unstructured as regards species interactions, while taking into account non-random features that A
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might occur for other ecological reasons. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests the presence of 
a non-random structuring process beyond those incorporated in the null model. 
Null model algorithms typically begin with an input reference matrix, or “observed” 
matrix, from which the various constraints are calculated. The algorithm is then able to generate 
matrices that are random samples from the ensemble of all possible matrices satisfying these 
constraints. For example, a widely applied null model generates an ensemble of random 
abundance matrices whose row sums are all fixed to the values of a given (observed) abundance 
matrix. This ensures that the pattern of species abundances in the observed metacommunity (e.g., 
resulting from variation in colonization abilities) are preserved in all the simulated 
metacommunities generated by the null model. Thus, all random metacommunities are completely 
unstructured, at least over and above the deliberately imposed observed row sum constraints. 
Other null models impose the constraint that only column sums of the random metacommunities 
are kept fixed to observed values. Still other null models fix both row and column constraints or 
allow only a small variability in them. 
Ulrich and Gotelli (2010), henceforth referred to as U&G, propose a total of 14 different 
null models for creating unstructured abundance matrices, which are essentially randomization 
algorithms. In addition to these 14 null models, U&G propose six statistics to measure community 
structure. From these, it is possible to create 14×6=84 hypothesis tests to detect structure in 
abundance data, by coupling a null model and a statistic. A key goal of U&G is to develop a 
benchmarking test that evaluates the performance of these different hypothesis tests, making it 
possible to choose the best option. Here we critically discuss their benchmarking procedure and 
find it unsuitable for ranking the different hypothesis tests. We argue that instead of U&G's 
scoring method, researchers should choose null models primarily based on biological 
considerations, while possibly also taking into account power and robustness to assumption 
violations relevant to their specific system (Heeren and D’Agostino 1987; Lehmann and Romano 
2005; Ladau 2008; Ladau and Schwager 2008). 
  Since the benchmarking methods developed in U&G are mostly extensions of those 
developed by Gotelli (2000) for presence-absence data, and are suggested as a general procedure 
to benchmark null hypothesis tests for other aspects of community structure, e.g., nestedness and A
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modularity (Gotelli and Ulrich 2012, Ulrich and Gotelli 2007, 2013), much of our criticism applies 
also to these other studies, to which we collectively refer as UGG. Despite their shortcomings, the 
main ideas presented in UGG are being taken up not only in many areas of basic ecological 
research (e.g., Chaves and Anez 2004, Feeley 2003, Kembel and Hubbell 2006, Lavender et al. 
2016, Lyons et al. 2016, McNickle et al. 2018, Mouillot et al. 2005, Peres-Neto et al. 2001), but 
also policy-oriented studies (Kobza et al 2004, Semmens et al. 2010, Schmidlin et al. 2012, 
Tulloch et al. 2018) and even studies of the microbiome (Li et al. 2018). Moreover, these same 
criticisms apply also to new benchmarking methods for testing structure in ecological networks 
(Vaughan et al. 2018). Surprisingly, the basic problems discussed here do not appear to have been 
addressed previously, yet their relevance could be of crucial importance for all these related 
studies. 
Review of basic concepts 
As an aid for the ensuing discussion, it is helpful to briefly review fundamental concepts regarding 
hypothesis tests (for more details, see Sokal and Rohlf 1995). A hypothesis test is a statistical tool 
to choose between competing hypotheses, the null (and usually simpler) hypothesis  and an 𝐻0
alternative  (often left unspecified). The process involves evaluating a statistic, , that is, a 𝐻𝑎 𝑇
function of the observed data, and determining whether its value is  exceptional, under the 
assumption that the null hypothesis  is true. One then asks, under the null hypothesis , what 𝐻0 𝐻0
is the probability of observing a sample for which the value of the statistic is at least as extreme as 
that observed? This probability is the p-value of the data. The experimenter then rejects the null 
hypothesis if the p-value is smaller than a preselected cut-off value,  referred to as the 𝛼
significance level of the test, and fails to reject it otherwise. Thus, a hypothesis test consists of  a 
null hypothesis , a test statistic , and a significance level . Importantly, the null hypothesis 𝐻0 𝑇 𝛼
must imply a specific distribution for the statistic  which may be calculated analytically or 𝑇
evaluated numerically. 
A Type I error, or false positive, occurs when the null hypothesis  is rejected despite 𝐻0
being true. The rate at which  is rejected when the test is applied to null data (i.e., data 𝐻0
generated by the null hypothesis) is by definition  percent, and referred to as the Type I 100 ×  𝛼A
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error rate (or false positive rate).  The significance level is typically set at   or 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.05
corresponding to Type I error rates of 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Similarly, Type II errors, or false negatives, occur when   is not rejected, even though 𝐻0
the alternative  is true. The probability of a false negative is denoted by , and the probability 𝐻𝑎 𝛽
of correctly rejecting ,  is termed the power of the test, and reflects its ability to detect an 𝐻0 1 ― 𝛽,
alternative hypothesis. It is difficult to put much faith in a test having low power, since when such 
a test fails to reject , it might well be because the test was simply not very sensitive. 𝐻0
Given a null hypothesis, we usually first choose the significance level  and then (if the 𝛼
alternative hypothesis allows) we measure  for various test-statistics. This allows a  comparison 𝛽
between various hypothesis tests (composed of a null model, a test statistic and a fixed ) differing 𝛼
only in their test-statistic. By design, null hypothesis tests constructed in this manner have the 
same Type I error rate (determined by ), regardless of which statistic is used. We then choose the 𝛼
statistic that yields the lowest Type II error rate, i.e., the highest power
Benchmarking null hypothesis tests
Henceforth, we focus on the main question motivating UGG:  How should one choose the best 
null hypothesis test for detecting species interactions that might affect the structure of a 
metacommunity (e.g., causing species aggregation or segregation)? Two fundamental questions 
arise:
1. All else being equal, what would this metacommunity look like without species 
interspecific interactions?
2. What feature is the most appropriate for identifying processes that create 
community structure?
Answering the first question corresponds to choosing a null model representing the 
absence of species interactions. In situations in which species differences (e.g., demographic 
parameters or trophic levels) are unimportant, and species can be considered functionally 
equivalent, this can be addressed using neutral models of community assembly (Bell 2005, Gotelli 
& McGill 2006). The second question corresponds to the choice of a test statistic for detecting A
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such interspecific interactions. When a null model has been chosen, it is simple to compare tests 
differing only in their test statistics (when power can be estimated). UGG’s main contribution is a 
proposed method to answer both questions at once, i.e., to compare tests differing in both their null 
hypotheses and statistics. We refer to such a comparison procedure as benchmarking.
The novelty of benchmarking is in deciding on the best null model for helping identify 
species interactions. Selecting such a null model would naïvely require testing several null models 
against data about what the metacommunity of interest would look like without species 
interactions. But, such data are usually absent (because if we knew that species interactions 
haven’t shaped our data, we would not be seeking a hypothesis test for identifying species 
interactions). Given this difficulty in null model selection, a successful benchmarking procedure 
would be extremely useful.
U&G present fourteen null model algorithms and 6 statistics, giving rise to 84 different 
null hypothesis tests. But how should a researcher choose which is the most appropriate test? The 
approach recommended by U&G is as follows.
U&G use another (fifteenth) algorithm to create a set of reference "unstructured test 
matrices”, a collection of manufactured abundance matrices representing synthetic 
metacommunities with no interactions between species. The test matrices have row sums with a 
predefined log-normal distribution (because the log-normal distribution of abundance data is one 
of ecology’s best-documented scaling laws; Preston, 1962a&b, McGill et al. 2006). However, they 
are constructed carefully to ensure there is no hidden mechanism that creates species segregation 
or aggregation. (More precisely, U&G use two pools of unstructured test matrices, which they 
denote  and , respectively, that are constructed using slightly different algorithms; however, 𝑀𝑅 𝑀𝑆
this does not affect our argument below. Gotelli (2000) uses four different algorithms to generate 
test matrices.) U&G also construct a set of structured test matrices by manipulating the 
unstructured test matrices to make species artificially aggregated or segregated.  
U&G then apply the 84 null hypothesis tests to the sets of unstructured and structured test 
matrices, and suggest a two-step benchmarking procedure to assess their performance. First, they 
select the four null hypothesis tests that reject the null hypothesis for the fewest number of 
unstructured test matrices. They then score this subset of tests using the proportion of the A
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structured test matrices for which the null hypothesis was rejected. We henceforth focus on the 
first step of UGG’s benchmarking procedure, that is, of the 84 null hypothesis tests, selecting the 
one that rejects the least number of unstructured matrices is considered to be the best test.
Problems with UGG’s Benchmarking Method
In this section, we highlight problems with U&G’s benchmarking methodology. Before 
highlighting the main conceptual problem and its repercussions, we address a terminological issue 
that obscures the overall underlying logic.
Problem 1: confusion between type I errors and power (terminological)
UGG define the "Type I error rate" of a null model as the proportion of unstructured test 
matrices that it rejects. This definition is nonstandard and imprecise, because the test matrices used 
to calculate this rejection rate are created using an algorithm different from the null model 
randomization algorithms U&G analyze. These unstructured test matrices are therefore not “null” 
with respect to any of the 84 null hypothesis tests U&G propose, despite being constructed so as to 
reflect no species interactions and having log-normal abundance distributions.  Indeed, U&G find 
that for each and every null model they examine, there is a statistic with which the rejection rate 
for the unstructured test matrices is much greater than 5% (see table 1 in U&G).  This indicates 
that each of the null models tested differs from the algorithm used to generate the unstructured test 
matrices in some way that relates to species co-occurrence (because the statistics used were 
selected in order to detect patterns in co-occurrence). This could not occur if the unstructured test 
matrices were truly null (with respect to any one of the null models used), because by definition, 
when , exactly 5% of all null matrices are rejected. α = 0.05
Because the unstructured test matrices are generated by an algorithm different from the 
null model, the quantity that UGG measure is the frequency at which the null hypothesis correctly 
rejects the unstructured matrices. Thus, UGG measure the power of the various hypothesis tests  (
), yet refer to it as the type I error rate. (In making the power calculation, the implied 1 ― 𝛽
alternative hypothesis is that the data were generated from the algorithm that created the 
unstructured test matrices.) Referring to the rejection of the unstructured test matrices as “type I 
errors” is a confusing and nonstandard use of a common technical term.A
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We emphasize that U&G are well-aware of their nonstandard use of terminology. They 
write that “[a]lthough the formal definition of a Type I error is incorrect rejection of a true null 
hypothesis, we use [a different] operational definition here of rejection of  on a set of 𝐻0
appropriate [unstructured] test matrices created by random sampling from a log-normal 
distribution” (U&G, p.3386).  Nonetheless, the distinction between their “operational definition” 
and the standard one is downplayed or obscured throughout, leading to the impression that true 
Type I and II error rates are really being measured. 
Treating the unstructured test matrices as if they were null can be thought of as simply 
keeping the idea of what “null” means imprecise, i.e., that “null” means conforming to some idea 
of being “unstructured”. This is problematic because communities can be unstructured in many 
different ways, as is evidenced by the many possible null models U&G benchmark, all of which 
create abundance matrices that could in principle be considered unstructured. Using the term 
“null” in this way introduces a vagueness that is similar to that entailed by calling something 
“random”: random numbers can be generated using many different distributions, but samples from 
a normal and a uniform distribution look very different from one another. The particulars of the 
random process can matter quite a bit, and similarly, so can the particulars of what it means to be 
“unstructured”.
Problem 2: Using a particular null model to benchmark others (conceptual)
The following important problem we raise is conceptual. Contrary to standard procedure, 
U&G do not assume a particular null model and compare different statistics.  Instead, they 
compare entire hypothesis tests, that is, statistics and null models taken together as a unit. But in 
selecting a hypothesis test, UGG also select a null model. It is therefore natural to ask, is the null 
hypothesis selected by U&G’s benchmarking procedure our best guess for a model of the true 
processes shaping this metacommunity, excluding the (possible) effects of species interactions? 
We argue that the answer is no. Because this issue has gone unnoticed for almost two decades, we 
present two different arguments to support this claim.  
Argument 1: The forces shaping different metacommunities may well differ, so we expect 
that testing for species interactions in different metacommunities will often require using different 
null models. To decide which of, say, two such “guesses” better describes a metacommunity, one A
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must study the metacommunity in question, not which of these two null models better-describes a 
dataset generated by a third model of metacommunities without species interactions. For example, 
the question of whether or not to use a null model in which column sums are constrained translates 
to a question about the ecological system being studied: is there an ecological reason why some of 
the sites being studied support more species than others (e.g., because they are more readily 
colonized)? Note also that while empirically studying what a metacommunity might look like in 
the absence of interspecific interactions (which is a counterfactual proposition) is often unfeasible, 
this does not detract from our logical argument.
In essence, UGG’s benchmarking process is analogous to comparing apples and oranges 
by using plums as a reference. This can lead us to choose the model that most resembles that used 
to generate the test matrices (see our second argument below), and to choose a statistic with low 
sensitivity to the differences between the null models being benchmarked and the one that is used 
to do the benchmarking (see Problem 4).
Argument 2: U&G’s benchmarking procedure is biased to choose the matrix 
randomization algorithm that "most resembles" the algorithm used to generate the unstructured 
test matrices. Indeed, U&G write: “these analyses are […] optimized for their performance on the 
set of matrices that we created by random sampling from a lognormal distribution of species 
abundances.” U&G consider the unstructured test matrix generation algorithm to be a good model 
of real unstructured ecological metacommunities; as such, the null hypothesis tests are scored 
based on their performance on these unstructured test matrices. 
However, U&G’s test-matrix generation algorithm is composed of two distinct parts: (a) a 
procedure for generating log-normal and uniform species and site abundance distributions 
(respectively); and, (b) a “randomization algorithm” used to allocate fractions of these log-
normally distributed abundances to particular entries in the matrix. And although the log-normal 
distribution of species abundances is well-supported in many ecological applications, U&G’s 
choice of algorithm for distributing these species abundances across sites (i.e., columns) is not 
empirically supported. 
Note that the species abundances of U&G’s test matrices being log-normally distributed 
does not imply that the test-matrix randomization algorithm is better-justified than other null A
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models (i.e., randomization algorithms) U&G propose. To see this, observe that different 
randomization algorithms that preserve row sums can be applied to a particular empirically-
derived abundance matrix with log-normally distributed species abundances. Matrices generated 
in this way will still have a log-normal abundance distribution, and the process used to generate 
them is not necessarily more or less “natural” than the one U&G use to generate the unstructured 
test matrices.
The following argument illustrates the circularity of benchmarking null models based on 
their performance on the unstructured test matrices generated from a procedure that is not 
empirically supported. Because the test-matrix randomization algorithm is not "better" or more 
natural than the null models (that is, randomization algorithms) being benchmarked, it could be 
considered a 15th possible null model, which we refer to as RTEST. It is then possible to construct 
hypothesis tests based on this new randomization algorithm (e.g., by combining it with each of the 
6 statistics of U&G, similar to the 14 null model algorithms U&G benchmarked). 
We are then faced with two possibilities: 
1. If we believe the test-matrix randomization algorithm RTEST is preferable to the 14 null models 
benchmarked by U&G, then there is no reason to consider the other null models; we need only 
choose between null hypothesis tests constructed by pairing RTEST with one of the six statistics 
proposed by U&G. In this case, we can then fix the significance level  and choose the statistic 𝛼
that yields the best power.
2. If we are uncertain whether RTEST is better than the 14 null models suggested by U&G, then 
RTEST should also be benchmarked and compared against the other 14 null models.  But if we do 
so, the unstructured test matrices will be rejected at a rate of exactly α for any statistic chosen 
(because RTEST was used to create them). Thus, U&G’s benchmarking procedure would be biased 
in favour of selecting RTEST. 
In other words, there is no need to run the test on fourteen randomization algorithms if we 
already know which is best. If we do not a-priori know the best randomization algorithm to use, 
then we want a selection criterion that is not biased in favour of one or another randomization 
algorithm, a quality that UGG’s benchmarking methodology lacks. (Replacing RTEST with another A
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randomization algorithm to generate unstructured test matrices will similarly result in a 
benchmarking procedure that favours this new randomization algorithm.)
Lastly, we note that this problem is essentially the same criticism that U&G have towards 
other studies. They write (page 3385 therein) “A [different] approach is to specify a mechanistic 
colonization model that does not include species interactions, such as the neutral model (Bell 
2005), and then use that model to create random matrices that can be used to evaluate null model 
procedures (Ulrich 2004). The disadvantage of this method is that the test is narrowly optimized 
for one particular mechanistic model, and there is no logical reason that this model should have 
priority.” We agree, but also extend this criticism to U&G’s model for generating test matrices.  
Problem 3:  A null hypothesis test cannot be “prone to Type I errors” (terminological)
UGG state that some tests are more prone to Type I errors and therefore not very effective. 
However, for a given significance level , a test cannot be more or less prone to Type I errors, 𝛼
because the Type I error rate is by definition exactly  percent (but see the section 100 × 𝛼
“robustness: overview” below). The number of rejected matrices in a set of  matrices generated 𝑁
using the null model is binomially distributed with parameters  and . As such, the true Type I 𝑁 𝛼
error rate as a score for different tests is uninformative because any difference between the 
theoretical and observed rejection rates results from the stochastic nature of generating matrices 
using the null model, not the choice of statistic or null model.
Problem 4:  Benchmarking encourages low power (conceptual)
Since the power of the test to correctly reject the null hypothesis when confronted with the 
unstructured test matrices is mislabelled as the Type I error (see Problem 1), UGG would like it to 
be around the -level they have set, and are thus ensuring a very low power by setting 
  (0.1 in Gotelli 2000). A power of 5% means that in practice, the hypothesis test will 1 ― 𝛽 = 0.05
not be able to distinguish between its null model and the alternative model generating the 
unstructured test matrices; for 95% of the unstructured test matrices the test will incorrectly fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Experimenters invariably strive to design a test with high power, so that 
if the null hypothesis  is not true, they will most likely know about it. This cannot happen when 𝐻0
the power is set at . Moreover, as we show in a sequence of examples in Appendix 1 ― 𝛽 = 0.05A
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S1, seeking a statistic that is “blind” to the differences between a null model and a particular 
alternative model (qualitatively similar to the null model) can lead to choosing a statistic that has 
low power to distinguish other alternative models that are qualitatively very different from the 
null.     
Beyond benchmarking
Having established that the benchmarking methods proposed by UGG are not a sound 
guide to selecting a hypothesis test, how should one choose from a set of hypothesis tests? 
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer. No single null hypothesis test is appropriate in all 
ecological contexts; rather, the null hypothesis and statistic should be selected on a case-by-case 
basis, based on the specific characteristics of the system being studied. Here, we outline some 
suggestions for factors that should be taken into account in this process. Most of these have been 
identified long ago (see for example Weiher and Keddy 1999), but bear repeating given the 
widespread use of UGG’s benchmarking procedure for justifying null model selection, rather than 
ecological considerations.  
As mentioned, different ecological contexts will require different null models. In 
particular, whether or not to incorporate row and column constraints has been a source of debate 
for decades (e.g., Stone and Roberts 1990; Weiher and Keddy 1999; Gotelli 2000). For example, 
row sums should in many cases be constrained because they reflect differences in vagility or 
colonizing ability.  But if species are closely related, competition might influence the row sums 
themselves, and a species might be more common than another simply because it arrived or 
evolved first. As noted by Fox (1999), this issue is linked to the Narcissus effect, whereby 
“[s]ampling from a post-competition pool underestimates the role of competition, since its effect is 
already reflected in the pool” (Colwell and Winkler 1984).  
Similar care should also be given to choosing a statistic that is sensitive to the ways in 
which we expect species interactions to manifest in the ecological metacommunity being studied. 
One important difficulty is that inferences based on statistics that are designed to measure the 
same structural property are sometimes contradictory, even when using hypothesis tests with 
identical null models (Stone and Roberts, 1992, Gotelli and Ulrich 2012, Strona and Fattorini 
2014). This suggests that intuitions about both how to measure different metacommunity A
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properties (e.g., segregation, aggregation, nestedness, turnover and modularity) and the 
relationships between them can be misleading. Using process-based models of metacommunity 
formation which allow the properties in question (in contrast to the matrix randomization 
algorithms proposed by UGG) can help evaluate whether and how different statistics reflect these 
structural properties. 
When the null model has been chosen, and an alternative model of metacommunity 
structure in the presence of species interactions is available, measuring a test’s power to discern 
between the null and alternative hypotheses is informative. If several statistics seem plausible for 
detecting species interactions, the power of the resulting tests is a natural measure for ranking 
them. It also is particularly desirable that a test be unbiased, i.e., that it correctly rejects the null 
hypothesis more often than it does incorrectly (Lehmann and Romano 2005).
Any null model we select, however biologically plausible, will be a caricature of reality. 
Consequently, it is also important to see whether or not a test might still be robust to certain 
deviations from its hypotheses. Robustness testing, reviewed below, is a powerful framework, but 
is unfortunately underused in ecology. We also briefly discuss approaches outside the null 
hypothesis testing paradigm in Appendix S2.
Robustness: overview
Testing for robustness is a modern statistical procedure (Lehmann and Romano 2005, 
Ladau 2008, Ladau and Schwager 2008) that requires considering scenarios whereby the null 
model's underlying assumptions might not be satisfied, but the null hypothesis being tested still is. 
For example, a common procedure for testing that the mean of a dataset is 0, is to use a Z-test.  
However, Z-tests rely on the additional assumption that the data are normally distributed. The 
normality assumption, however, is independent of the null hypothesis we wish to test — that the 
data have mean 0 — and the result of the Z-test does not indicate whether or not this additional 
assumption is satisfied. In general, the experimental datasets satisfy such additional assumptions 
(e.g., normality) only approximately, or not at all. In such cases, the probability of rejection of the 
null hypothesis could be larger or smaller than the significance level of the test, even though the 
dataset satisfies the null hypothesis being tested (e.g., mean 0). Only in this context is it A
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meaningful to say that the test is prone to Type I errors (Huber 1996, Heeren and D’Agostino 
1987).
Null hypothesis tests are said to be robust if the observed (nominal) Type I error rates are 
maintained close to the pre-selected significance level α when some assumptions of the null model 
are violated (e.g., Heeren and D’Agostino 1987, Sullivan and D'Agostino 1992). In this context of 
testing robustness, even though the full assumptions of the null model are not met, we continue to 
describe the rejection of data satisfying the null hypothesis as Type I errors. For example, the two-
sample t-test (for equality of means; see Sokal and Rohlf 1995) is based on the assumption that the 
observations are derived from normal distributions of equal variance and there are sufficiently 
many samples.  However, it has been shown that this test is robust to non-normality, small sample 
size, and in some situations, unequal variances of the sample distributions (see Sullivan and 
D'Agostino 1992). Thus, verifying the robustness of a hypothesis test to violations of some of its 
assumptions helps us know that our inferences from the test may still be valid, even when we 
cannot guarantee that some of the test's assumptions hold for our experimental data. 
Note that UGG’s benchmarking process is not a test of robustness.  A test of robustness 
aims to measure the effects of gradual and controlled changes in the individual assumptions of a 
model (Sullivan and D'Agostino 1992; Lehmann and Romano 2005). Instead, UGG check whether 
the rejection rates of the tests are substantially changed when the entire null model is altered, 
comparing all the null models under consideration to an essentially unrelated model that is based 
on vastly different assumptions. This is why, when confronting the hypothesis tests with the 
unstructured test matrices, UGG find the rejection rates for some of the tests to be high 
(sometimes even 100%). Moreover, to use robustness for comparing different models, one must 
check the robustness of these algorithm to identical assumption violations. Thus, comparing the 
proportions of test matrices rejected is unfair because the assumption violations that transform 
each of the tested models into the test matrix generation algorithm are different.
Suggestions for robustness-testing in ecology
When exploring the effects of violations of the basic assumptions of hypothesis tests, it is 
imperative to clearly state what these assumptions are, which of these are being violated, and how. 
No less importantly, the biological reasons for the interest in the violation of assumptions should A
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be stated. Because many scenarios of assumption violations are not biologically relevant, or not 
relevant to the experiment in question, there is no need to make general statements as to the 
robustness or bias of tests for any assumption violation (which is no simple task). While Ladau's 
framework for systematically studying the effects of various violations of assumptions on a 
myriad of tests is very useful, his disappointment in not finding an all-purpose universally robust 
(and unbiased) test is unwarranted. The results of his study may be used by researchers to choose 
which test is relevant for their particular study design. We emphasize that this requires researchers 
to be intimately familiar with both the biological systems studied and the statistical methods 
involved. Unfortunately, many ecologists will likely find Ladau (2008) inaccessible due to the 
heavy technical jargon and terse description of the mathematical methods.
As an example, suppose that after careful consideration of her study system, a researcher 
has opted to use a model with fixed zeros (i.e., species absences), fixed row sums, and column 
probabilities proportional to sums (a minor variation on the model “ITR” in U&G), and an 
appropriate statistic (selected, for instance, based on a power analysis). One might expect the 
conditions of fixed row sums and fixed zeroes to fluctuate somewhat in biological data, even 
though, in principle, these are the constraints relevant to this study system. At the very least, 
random errors in measurements of these constraints would arise due to sampling. Thus, it would 
be useful for the researcher explore how robust the test is to gradually increasing fluctuations in 
the row sums, or in the locations of zeros in the abundance matrix. She could then estimate these 
fluctuations empirically from the experimental data (sampling errors could also be evaluated) and 
assess the relevance and reliability of the inferences made using this hypothesis test. 
UGG and Ladau test a plethora of null models against an alternative model that is often 
structurally very different from the null models being benchmarked. Instead, we suggest future 
research into more standard tests of robustness. This would involve evaluating the robustness of 
specific null hypothesis tests to “gentler” changes in their underlying assumptions (ideally the 
magnitude of the deviation from the null hypothesis can be turned up or down using an appropriate 
parameter). This is a promising area of research that UGG and Ladau (2008) seem to be moving 
towards.
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Two final caveats are that the robustness of a test is not an excuse for sloppy modelling or 
experimental setups, and that robustness should not be the sole criterion by which we choose our 
tests. Robust tests using unrealistic models or uninformative statistics are not superior to non-
robust tests with realistic, biologically relevant models and statistics. Additionally, when choosing 
between models for explaining a particular phenomenon, the ability to explain other patterns may 
and should also be used as a gauge of a model's viability.
Conclusion
UGG address the question of how to detect structure in an ecological metacommunity by 
suggesting a method for benchmarking null hypothesis tests by comparing the results of null 
hypothesis tests (differing in their null models and statistics) when confronted with a dataset 
constructed using a null model different from all those tested.  Though the goal of UGG is 
worthwhile, their suggested solution suffers from various statistical and methodological problems, 
the most important of which is that comparing tests with different null models on a set of 
artificially-constructed test matrices does not inform us which null model better describes a 
particular real ecological metacommunity. The reasons this problem has heretofore gone unnoticed 
are likely confusion and vagueness relating to the concepts of randomness, null models and Type I 
errors. 
Choosing a hypothesis test is a real concern for ecologists in particular and scientists in 
general, and there is much confusion about how to do so throughout the literature. A simple 
prescription does not exist, but neither do we expect one to appear, due to the broad terms in 
which the problem is posed. U&G and especially Gotelli (2000) are correct to stress that there is 
no “all-purpose” test to use, and that sound judgment should be used when constructing a 
hypothesis test: “Ecologists need to move beyond the idea that there is a single “one-size-fits-all” 
null model that is appropriate. Rather, the null model and index should be chosen based on the 
kind of data […] collected and the question being asked” (Gotelli 2000). 
In the previous section, we outlined general guidelines for selecting and evaluating 
hypothesis tests to detect community structure. The selection of a null hypothesis test must not be A
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based on trying to choose a null model (i.e., randomization algorithm) and statistic such that the 
statistic’s distribution on data generated by the null model is similar to the same statistic's 
distribution on some other reference model. Instead, it should be grounded in intimate knowledge 
of the study system and thoughtful scrutiny of the biological, ecological and statistical 
considerations involved. If a sensible model for the alternative hypothesis is available, the power 
of a test to detect the alternative can inform the selection of a test statistic (statistics resulting in 
higher power are better). Tests that are biased (i.e., reject the null hypothesis incorrectly more 
often than they do correctly) should be avoided. Since “all models are wrong” (Box 1976), it is 
also worthwhile to evaluate a hypothesis test’s robustness (i.e., its performance under biologically 
plausible violations of some of its basic assumptions). Note, however, that few guidelines are 
available for testing robustness of ecological null models (see Ladau 2008; Ladau and Schwager 
2008). This challenging area requires future research to mature, and to make these tests more 
accessible to ecologists.
Lastly, the confusion we highlight surrounding null model selection in general, and type I 
errors in particular, suggests to us a real and pressing need to better train ecology graduates in 
statistics. In general, the current state-of-the-art statistical software is extremely powerful and 
readily accessible, but without a deep understanding of the theory involved, it is all too easily 
misused.  
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